Europe is slowly but surely emerging from its dimensions of purely civilian power.

Motivated by events, be it the war in Ukraine, not the general instability in the Mediterranean or the Trumpian winds, the EU is trying to give itself a more organized and clear strategic and military dimension, able to position it as a player of reference. In international scenarios alongside powers that are constantly searching for geopolitical spaces where they can project their influence and extract resources to transform them into the value needed to fuel increasingly sophisticated and structured economies.

In this new great game, European countries are too small to withstand excessive competition that involves multiple levels: from the competition for the aforementioned resources, to the level of huge vertical technological sectors, through the knowledge sphere. Therefore, there is no alternative to greater connectivity, integration, and strengthening of the strategic dimension that moves primarily from the definition of the minimum set of common interests and the most appropriate set of military tools to ensure its defence. The next European Commission, which will emerge from the June elections, will be crucial to this readjustment in Europe.

The readjustment should start with a review of the treaties and the creation of a defense commissioner position, as well as with a search for new tools to finance defense spending, starting with Eurobonds. Therefore, it is a guide for defense policy and a leverage with which to strengthen the Old Continent's industrial base, the gaps of which have been relentlessly exposed by the demonstration of support in Kiev. The European Defense Fund (EDF) is today valued at $8 billion, to which $1.5 billion has been added for research and development in strategic technologies, as part of the review of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027. Then there is another billion and a half from EDIP (European Defense Industrial Programme) in the three-year period 2025-2027. It is not enough.

Let us remember that Ukraine will “eat” from the European Peace Facility (EPF), $11.1 billion in 2022-2024, that the warehouses are empty and that the EPF was originally worth 13 billion euros. From this point of view, Brussels must increasingly finance the purchase of vehicles and systems, not just R&D, demonstrations and prototypes, in a way that encourages new industrial clusters. However, Europe needs not only to support and stimulate large cooperation programs, but also to strengthen its industrial base, restore the “home” production lost over the past 30 years and re-establish a strong supply chain that is as independent as possible from external supplies. Asian Codes for Electronic Materials and Components.

Deterrence is a consequence of its credibility, but one cannot have credibility without a sovereign supply chain “liberated” from geopolitical constraints and closures. We face a crossroads in history and a world in which war has, unfortunately, once again become a tragic normalcy.

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